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161 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A 
MULTIPOLAR WORLD 
INTRODUCTION 
Humanitarian intervention is at a crossroads. In theory, humanitarian 
intervention has made significant advances in recent years; the 
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine (or R2P) has achieved widespread 
adoption within a relatively short period of time. But in practice, 
humanitarian intervention appears to have reached a nadir. For Western 
nations, especially the United States, humanitarian goals have largely 
given way to security imperatives in the post-9/11 age. Since 2001, global 
instability has also risen, multiplying the list of possible candidates for 
humanitarian intervention. Yet in 2015, many conflicts exist around the 
world where humanitarian intervention has not yet been seriously 
discussed, let alone attempted. A growing acknowledgment of the failures 
of prior Western-backed military actions—both for humanitarian purposes 
(as in Rwanda, Somalia, and Libya) as well as for regime change (as in 
Iraq and Afghanistan)—has placed the burden of proof upon those 
favoring interventions to justify their positions as well as to set forth a 
clear “exit strategy.” For reasons of economy and policy, isolationism 
across both the left and the right of the political spectrum in the U.S. and 
Europe has also risen to levels not seen in decades.
1
 In the face of these 
pressures, the international community will need to adopt a new 
framework in order for humanitarian intervention not to become 
moribund. 
To function in a multipolar world, humanitarian intervention must 
promote the formation of robust coalitions of intervening nations. Forming 
these coalitions will require a renewed reservoir of political will on the 
domestic front, as well as improved international relations, especially 
among the “great powers” of the United States, Russia, China, and the 
European Union. In the twenty-first century, the international community 
collectively possesses more resources than ever to prevent and to end mass 
atrocity crimes, but forging a political consensus to accomplish this end, in 
a competitive multipolar world, will likely prove to be a much more 
difficult task. 
 
 
 1. Max Fisher, American Isolationism Just Hit a 50-Year High. Why That Matters, Wᴀsʜ. Pᴏsᴛ, 
Dec. 3, 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/04/ 
american-isolationism-just-hit-a-50-year-high-why-that-matters/. 
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Part I of this Note will trace the history of humanitarian intervention 
from the 1980s to present day, focusing on how geopolitics has 
continually shaped humanitarian intervention. Part II will discuss the 
challenges of forming coalitions in favor of intervention within the 
emerging multipolar geopolitical world, whether through the U.N. or 
regional organizations. Part III summarizes and concludes with a 
prediction on the future of humanitarian intervention. 
I. TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK—FROM THE 1980S TO TODAY 
Humanitarian intervention is often thought of as a relatively new 
practice, but its roots are ancient.
2
 As recently as the 1980s, the primary 
 
 
 2. Humanitarian intervention, broadly defined, is the devotion of resources in response to a 
humanitarian crisis in another country—this includes forcible as well as non-forcible methods. David 
J. Scheffer, Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253–74 
(1992). Under this broad definition, a humanitarian intervention may be undertaken mostly or entirely 
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), need not consist of armed force, and may have the 
consent or encouragement of the sovereign nation subject to intervention. The international 
community’s responses to natural disasters, such as the Indonesian tsunami in 2004 and the Haitian 
earthquake in 2010, provide examples of “benign” humanitarian intervention. With few exceptions, 
“benign” humanitarian intervention enjoys broad support across the international community, but this 
is not the focus of this article. Except as otherwise noted, this article uses the term “humanitarian 
intervention” in a more limited sense to refer to the use of armed force by one nation in response to a 
humanitarian crisis in another nation, against the will of the nation subject to intervention. This type of 
“hostile” humanitarian intervention is much more controversial. The use of armed force by an outside 
power for the ostensible benefit of another nation has a long history. Humanitarianism has been a 
major jus ad bellum for many hegemonic powers in particular. For example, the civilization/barbarism 
dichotomy formed the basis of the Roman Empire’s justification of its own expansion. Neil Faulkner, 
The Official Truth: Propaganda in the Roman Empire, BBC HISTORY, Oct. 15, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/romans/romanpropaganda_article_01.shtml. Chinese dynasties 
throughout the imperial period exercised various degrees of control over neighboring peoples for their 
ostensible benefit. FENG ZHANG, CHINESE HEGEMONY: GRAND STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN EAST ASIAN HISTORY 138 (2015). Chinese learning and culture was viewed by 
Chinese as superior, as was the wisdom of the Chinese Emperor, the ruler of the earth. DAVID C. 
KANG, EAST ASIA BEFORE THE WEST: FIVE CENTURIES OF TRADE AND TRIBUTE 54–56 (2010). 
Beginning in the 16th century, Spanish conquistadores, though primarily interested in gold, trade, and 
advancing the interests of the Spanish crown, also viewed their conquests in the New World as 
beneficial to Native Americans. Ronald W. Batchelder & Nicolas Sanchez, The Encomienda and the 
Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas, 156 PUB. CHOICE 
45 (2013). Missionaries afforded natives the opportunity to convert to Catholicism and thus achieve 
eternal salvation; to this end, the Catholic Church was even viewed as the “protector of the Indians.” 
Id. In the 19th century, the British Empire’s control over much of the globe was sometimes justified in 
terms of humanitarian benefit to indigenous populations who had not yet formed self-governing 
nations. JOHN STUART MILL, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in 21 ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, 
AND EDUCATION 109–24 (John M. Robson ed., 1984), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ 
255#lf0223-21_head_040. A great irony that the “second wave” of colonialism was situated within a 
larger framework of Westphalian rivalry, which depended upon respect for the sovereign authority of 
other European nations even as it denied the same recognition to established tribal and other 
indigenous forms of government. The British did, however, in many places establish a practice of 
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impetus for interventions by the world’s two superpowers—the United 
States and the Soviet Union—was not humanitarianism, but rather 
realpolitik and core national interests such as trade and security.
3
 In the 
 
 
“indirect rule” which allowed colonial authority to be channeled through local rulers. See Michael 
Crowder, Indirect Rule: French and British Style, 34 J. INT’L AFRICAN INST. 197, 197–98 (July 1964), 
available at http://sites.middlebury.edu/psci0321s14/files/2014/02/Michael-Crowder-1964-French-vs.-
British-Indirect-Rule.pdf. From today’s vantage point, however, it is not so difficult to sense that 
transparent self-interest rather than altruism underlay such humanitarian justifications of Roman, 
Chinese, Spanish, and British imperial rule. Indeed, developing countries have been loudest in their 
condemnation of humanitarian interventions, which they view as merely a continuation of old 
imperialist ways. By the 1990s, however, humanitarian intervention had arguably achieved a new and 
different character. Humanitarian intervention, rather than a unilateral undertaking by one hegemon, 
was, at least in theory, a responsibility which fell upon the entire international community. Support for 
this new theory of humanitarian intervention may be found in international law as codified in the 
Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and, most recently, the U.N.’s adoption of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, ICRC (Dec. 9, 1948), https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp? 
documentId=1507EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005FB3E5&action=openDocument; See The Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/ eng/war-and-
law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm; See Outcome 
Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit, ¶¶ 138–40, A/RES/60/1 (2005), UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.pdf
#page=30. In spite of the new liberal internationalist conception of humanitarian intervention, this note 
posits that in the twenty-first century, a sovereign self-interested impulse continues to underlie the 
decision to intervene. U.N. peacekeeping forces notwithstanding, the primary repository of 
humanitarian force continues to be deployed by sovereign nations, especially the United States. To the 
extent this remains the case, the motivations for such interventions to remain unchanged from the more 
familiar self-interested motivations, which have animated sovereign nations’ decisions to intervene 
throughout history. 
 3. The Cold War period was a bipolar geopolitical order dominated by two superpowers, the 
U.S. and the USSR. Within this bipolar configuration, states alternately associated with the U.S. or the 
USSR for various benefits, including economic ties, technological progress, and national security. 
Developing close ties with one superpower or the other could be essential since the only force strong 
enough to deter or resist incursions by one superpower was the other superpower. “Pivoting” between 
the two axes of power was not unheard of, however, and could prove to be a beneficial course of 
action for a state. See, e.g., Lisa Reynolds Wolfe, Egypt Transfers Loyalty from the USSR to the US in 
the Middle of the Cold War, Cᴏʟᴅ Wᴀʀ Sᴛᴜᴅɪᴇs, June 10, 2010, available at http://www.coldwar 
studies.com/2010/06/10/egypt-transfers-loyalty-from-the-ussr-to-the-us-in-the-middle-of-the-cold-war/. 
Most significantly, China’s rapprochement with the U.S. following President Nixon’s visit to China in 
1972 gave China additional strategic flexibility in the face of pressure from the Soviet Union, 
euphemistically termed the “polar bear” in discussions. ALISTAIR HORNE, KISSINGER: 1973, THE 
CRUCIAL YEAR 136–37 (2009). Such deft diplomatic maneuvering, however, was not without its 
dangers, especially for smaller states located in the immediate neighborhood of the hostile superpower. 
Throughout the Cold War the United States [refer to United States consistently as U.S. or United 
States] remained keen as ever on exercising its influence in Latin America, an area of the world the 
U.S. has long regarded as its own backyard since at least the Monroe Doctrine. U.S. Stand Against 
Reds in Cuba Has Its Roots in Monroe Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1961, http://www.latin 
americanstudies.org/bay-of-pigs/NYT-4-19-61b.htm. For instance, the United States regarded the 
island nation of Grenada, a former British colony, as a hostile nation following a bloodless pro-Cuban 
coup in 1979. The U.S. Invasion of Grenada, Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs Hɪsᴛᴏʀʏ, http://www.u-s-
history.com/pages/h2047.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). A breakdown in civil order in Grenada in 
1982 provoked a U.S. intervention termed Operation Urgent Fury, which resulted in a democratically 
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1980s, interventions were unilateral and, as a result, more often than not 
generated considerable international controversy. For instance, the usual 
attitude adopted by the United Nations (hereinafter the “U.N.”) toward 
unilateral interventions by the two superpowers during the Cold War 
period was disapproval. For example, during the 1980s, the U.N. General 
Assembly considered resolutions condemning the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and American interventions in Grenada and Panama.
4
 The 
disapproval of international opinion as expressed through the General 
Assembly, however, proved insufficient to succeed in passing such 
 
 
elected, pro-U.S. government and the removal of Cuban influence from Grenada. See Operation 
Urgent Fury, GLOBALSECURITY.COM, May 7, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ 
urgent_fury.htm. The breakdown in civil order in Grenada and the ostensible threat to the lives of U.S. 
citizens provided the immediate impetus and rationale for the intervention. Operation Urgent Fury was 
by no means a primarily humanitarian intervention however. The U.S. decision to intervene in this 
small Caribbean island makes most sense in light of external geopolitical factors, especially U.S.-
Cuban hostility. As another example, the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989, termed Operation Just 
Cause, was undertaken against a different geopolitical backdrop: the “rapid decline of the Soviet 
Union.” Ronald Cole, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform, 20 JOINT FORCE Q. 
67–75 (1999), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a422959.pdf. In the case of Panama, 
the recent decline of Soviet power and prestige across the globe gave the U.S. additional strategic 
freedom to pressure Manuel Noriega, the military dictator of Panama who was not communist-aligned. 
Id. As in Grenada, a security breakdown and the desire to “restore democracy” provided the impetus 
and rationale for U.S. intervention. Most commentators, however, explain the U.S.’s decision to 
intervene in Panama with reference to more fundamental U.S. national interests: the drug trade and, 
especially, the Panama Canal’s vital role as a transit point for the U.S. Navy. Scott Rosenberg, 
Panama and Noriega: ‘Our S.O.B.’, 42 NAT’L REV. 14 (1990), available at http://history.emory.edu/ 
home/assets/documents/endeavors/volume1/Scotts.pdf. The Soviet Union too engaged in armed 
intervention in its geographical “backyard” for its own political interests, most recently in a prolonged 
campaign in Afghanistan which lasted from 1979 to 1989. The Afghan War, Tʜᴇ Cᴏʟᴅ Wᴀʀ Mᴜsᴇᴜᴍ, 
http://www.coldwar.org/articles/70s/afghan_war.asp. In the Afghan War, the Soviet Union intervened 
with the hopes of supporting a newly-established pro-Soviet regime, but encountered stiff resistance 
from mujahedeen rebels who were armed and supported by numerous anti-Soviet states, including the 
U.S., China, and Pakistan. Afghanistan 1979–1992, GʟᴏʙᴀʟSᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ.ᴏʀɢ, http://www.globalsecurity. 
org/intell/ops/afghanistan.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Much like the U.S. in the Vietnam War, the 
Soviet Union resorted to brutal scorched-earth tactics in an attempt to quell this insurgency. M. 
HASSAN KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND THE AFGHAN RESPONSE (1995), 
available at http://bactra.org/reviews/kakar-soviet-invasion/. It is estimated that over a million 
civilians died in the Afghan war as well as tens of thousands of Afghan and Soviet combatants, with 
over five million Afghans displaced from their homes. Id.  
 4. Richard Bernstein, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution ‘Deploring’ Grenada Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/29/world/us-vetoes-un-resolution-deploring-grenada-
invasion.html. The U.N. Security Council considered a resolution condemning the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada, but a resolution of condemnation was vetoed by the United States. The U.N. Security 
Council also attempted to condemn the U.S. invasion of Panama, with similar results. See Paul Lewis, 
Fighting in Panama: United Nations; Security Council Condemnation of Invasion Vetoed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/24/world/fighting-panama-united-nations-
security-council-condemnation-invasion-vetoed.html. Finally, the U.N. Security Council considered a 
resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but this resolution was blocked by a Soviet 
veto. DIEGO CORDOVEZ ET AL., OUT OF AFGHANISTAN: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SOVIET 
WITHDRAWAL 74 (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/9
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resolutions. The two superpowers were each themselves veto-wielding 
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, so either one could 
block any resolution against it.
5
 Thus, while a relatively robust 
international consensus opposed the use of force in developing nations, the 
intervention situation during the Cold War was effectively one of 
impunity. Only the counterbalancing force of the other superpower, as 
well as domestic political opposition, held in check the ability of either 
superpower to intervene in any part of the world. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, ushered in a new 
period in the history of intervention. The end of the Cold War, famously 
heralded by Francis Fukuyama as the “End of History,” eliminated the 
fierce bipolar rivalry for geopolitical supremacy that had been the main 
impetus behind unilateral superpower interventions.
6
 Instead, humanitarian 
concerns—especially preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity—moved to the forefront as guideposts for 
international peacekeeping.
7
 
 
 
 5. The U.S. and USSR (prior to its dissolution 1991) were both permanent members of the 
Security Council and thus held veto power over any Security Council resolution. See United Nations 
Security Council, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/topic/United-
Nations-Security-Council. 
 6. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, THE NAT’L INTEREST (Summer 1989), available at 
http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm. Francis Fukuyama’s famous and controversial “End of History” 
argument was that the collapse of Soviet communism marked the demise of the only real alternative to 
Western democratic liberalism. Id. As such, no barriers remained to prevent liberal democracy from 
eventually taking root in all countries. Despite the speedy and noteworthy replacement of many 
authoritarian regimes by liberal democracies in the early 1990s, especially in the post-Soviet bloc, 
subsequent events in the 2000s and 2010s have called Fukuyama’s thesis into doubt. Authoritarian 
models of governance have persisted in many countries, most notably Russia, Iran, and China, the rise 
of radical Islam, and the fragility of states in Africa and the Middle East that have attempted but failed 
to transition to democracy. In the face of such challenges, it appears that history is by no means 
finished. In a partial retreat from post-Cold War triumphalism, Fukuyama has since expounded upon 
this basic thesis by describing significant barriers to state-building and socioeconomic progress that 
arise from challenges within liberal democracy, as well as the danger of “decay” of advanced liberal 
societies. See Sheri Berman, Francis Fukuyama’s ‘Political Order and Political Decay’, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2014, at 3*, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/books/review/francis-fukuyamas-political-
order-and-political-decay.html?_r=0.  
 7. The Holocaust has served as a catalyst for the international movement to codify, detect and 
prevent the crime of genocide. Edward Kissi, The Holocaust as a Guidepost for Genocide Detection 
and Prevention in Africa, Tʜᴇ Hᴏʟᴏᴄᴀᴜsᴛ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴs Oᴜᴛʀᴇᴀᴄʜ Pʀᴏɢʀᴀᴍᴍᴇ, available 
at http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/paper5.shtml The crime of “genocide” was first 
legally defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as 
the targeting of a “national, racial, ethnic, or religious group” by a list of enumerated actions, which 
included but was not limited to “killing” and “causing serious bodily or mental harm.” Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 
(1948). The USSR successfully lobbied for the removal of proposed language defining the state 
targeting of political groups as genocide. David Shea Bettwy, The Genocide Convention and 
Unprotected Groups: Is the Scope of Protection Expanding Under Customary International Law?, 
NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 175–76 (2011).  
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The post-Cold War period heralded another fundamental change: 
multilateralism displaced unilateralism as the primary means to achieve 
these humanitarian ends.
8
 This transition from unilateral to multilateral 
interventions comports with the values asserted to be protected by 
humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian interventions may therefore be 
conceptualized, not as implicating narrow national interests, but as 
upholding a common international interest. For its part, the U.N. in its 
 
 
Interestingly, the definition for “genocide” did not yet exist at the time of the Nuremburg Trials. 
Instead, ex-Nazi officials were prosecuted for “crimes against peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes 
against humanity,” as elaborated in the 1945 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
(popularly known as “the Nuremburg Charter”). See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. War crimes were also notably elaborated in Article 147 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 73 U.N.T.S. 973. These early definitions of 
atrocity crimes were reaffirmed in 1995 via the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the first permanent international court established to prosecute such atrocity crimes. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998).  
 8. The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were uniformly undertaken by multilateral 
coalitions, marking a change from the unilateral interventions previously discussed (Grenada, Panama, 
and Afghanistan) at the close of the Cold War. Saban Kardas, Humanitarian Intervention: The 
Evolution of the Idea and Practice, 6 J. INT’L AFFAIRS 2 (June–July 2001), available at 
http://sam.gov.tr wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SabanKardas2.pdf. See, e.g., Operation Provide 
Comfort, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm 
(last updated May 7, 2011). Operations Provide Comfort and Provide Comfort II, undertaken to protect 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq from retaliation by the Hussein regime following the First Gulf War in 
1991, was undertaken by a coalition of the U.S., Great Britain, France, Turkey, and other nations. See 
Operation Provide Comfort II, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ 
provide_comfort_2.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and Operation 
Restore Hope, operations to secure delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalian refugees in response to 
famine and civil war in 1992–1993, was led primarily by the U.S. but also consisted of a 24 member 
nation coalition. Somalia—UNOSOM II Background, U.N. Pᴇᴀᴄᴇᴋᴇᴇᴘɪɴɢ, http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr1.html (Last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Similarly, Operation 
Restore Democracy, a U.S.-led intervention in Haiti, which succeeded in its twin aims of regime 
change (restoring the democratically-elected presidency of Jean-Manuel Aristide against the 
usurpation of a military coup) and humanitarian goals (stemming a crisis of Haitian refugees fleeing to 
the U.S. to escape deteriorating conditions), was carried out by a Multinational Force (MNF). 
Operation Uphold Democracy, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ 
uphold_democracy.htm (last updated May 7, 2011). Marking a break from the pattern of U.S. 
leadership in humanitarian missions, the U.N. response to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda in 1993, 
UNAMIR, was neither led, nor even participated in, by the United States. Nonetheless, under 
UNAMIR a multilateral coalition was assembled, and the contributions of the participating nations 
were redoubled in 1994 after the tragic scope of the Rwanda genocide became apparent. See 
Composition of Unamir, RWANDAFILE, http://www.rwandafile.com/other/unamircomposition.html 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Despite these efforts, the U.N.’s response under UNAMIR is regarded as a 
failure due to the failure of this mission to prevent or substantially hinder the genocide. Ignoring 
Genocide, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2015). Instead, the Rwandan genocide was only successfully ended by the military 
campaign of Tutsi exiles forming the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-
03.htm. 
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capacity as the formal trustee of this international interest, found itself, in 
an ironic reversal, increasingly on the pro-intervention side of the debate. 
Post-1991, the U.N. has assumed an active role both in the 
authorization and in the prosecution of humanitarian interventions. For 
instance, the U.N. Security Council’s approval was at least sought—and, 
more often than not, obtained—in every instance of humanitarian 
intervention in the 1990s.
9
 However, this consensus began to fracture, for 
several reasons. First, the importance of national security and 
counterterrorism moved to the forefront of Western foreign policy after 
9/11, especially in the United States. Second, assertions of the primacy of 
nation-state sovereignty—which had been continually voiced by great 
powers such as China throughout the 1990s—gained in traction as their 
backers gained in relative global influence. Third, political and scholarly 
re-evaluations of the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions 
undertaken during the 1990s and 2000s have called their effectiveness into 
question.  
 
 
 9. U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 condemned Iraqi aggression against Kurds and called 
for the international community to provide appropriate humanitarian efforts to the Kurds. See S.C. 
Res. 688, Apr. 5, 1991, available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SC688.pdf. This 
resulted in Operation Provide Comfort I and II, waged primarily via allied aerial sorties. Daniel L. 
Haulman, Crisis in Iraq: Operating Provide Comfort, SHORT OF WAR, http://www.afhso.af.mil/ 
shared/media/document/AFD-120823-031.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). Although the text of the 
U.N. resolution itself included no language providing for a no-fly zone, this omission, and the lack of 
protest at the coalition’s subsequent actions, suggests that the precise method of prosecuting 
humanitarian interventions may occasionally be left up to the intervener’s discretion. S.C. Res. 688 
(Apr. 5 1991). U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the U.S.-led humanitarian mission in 
Haiti, Operation Restore Democracy. S.C. Res. 940, ¶¶ 14–15 (July 31, 1994). A series of resolutions, 
including U.N. Security Council Resolution 819 and 824, condemned the ethnic cleansing of the 
Bosnian government in 1993, called for humanitarian aid, established “safe zones” for civilians, and 
implicitly authorized the later use of armed force to achieve those ends. S.C. Res. 819, ¶¶ 9–10, 18 
(Apr. 16, 1993), available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f2bc28; 
See also S.C. Res. 824 (May 6, 1993). The notable exception to the trend of U.N. ratification of 
humanitarian interventions in the 1990s is the NATO intervention in Kosovo; U.N. Resolution 1199, 
which called on Kosovo and Yugoslavia to achieve a ceasefire, was passed by the U.N. Security 
Council with no vetoes and only one abstention (by China). S.C. Res. 1199, ¶ 17 (Sept. 23, 1998). Due 
to the veto threat of Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and an ally of 
Yugoslavia, no U.N. resolutions were passed authorizing the use of outside force as part of a 
humanitarian intervention. The subsequent success of the NATO bombing campaign in forcing 
Slobodan Milosevic to sign a ceasefire agreement with the Kosovars has led to a consensus among 
commentators that the Kosovo intervention was “illegal but legitimate.” THE KOSOVO REPORT: 
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS, LEARNED 4–5 (2000). This view is reflected in the 
subsequent adoption of U.N. Resolution 1244 by the U.N. Security Council, ratifying the terms of the 
ceasefire procured through the NATO intervention, with no vetoes and one abstention (by China). S.C. 
Res. 1244, ¶¶ 31–44 (June 10, 1999).  
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A. Critiques and Challenges 
Criticism of the practice of humanitarian intervention comes from 
various angles. The first may be termed the “liberal-internationalist” 
critique. This point of view argues for the legality of humanitarian 
intervention and holds that humanitarian interventions have either been 
successful (East Timor is a commonly cited example) or, when 
unsuccessful, were unsuccessful because of lack of resources or political 
will
10
 In order to uphold this post-Nuremburg promise, liberal 
internationalists propose some combination of re-tasking Western 
militaries away from damaging distractions (such as regime change), 
 
 
 10. For a liberal-internationalist assessment of the efficacy of recent humanitarian interventions, 
see Santiago Delgado Calderon, The Need for Intervention: A Counterfactual Approach to 
Challenging War Theories, available at http://blogs.cornell.edu/policyreview/2012/03/15/the-need-
for-intervention-a-counterfactual-approach-to-challenging-war-theories/. The genocide in Rwanda is 
perhaps the most commonly cited example of the failure of the international community to act to halt 
atrocity crimes. It is estimated that the actions of the UNAMIR mission succeeded in saving the lives 
of several thousand Rwandans. Gilbert M. Kadiagala, Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of 
Rwanda, in MILITARY INTERVENTION: CASES IN CONTEXT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 67, 86 
(William J. Lahneman ed., 2012). However, given that the final death toll in the Rwandan genocide 
numbered over one million, it is not at all clear what measures, if any, by the international community 
could have prevented the broader genocide. Could Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide Have Been Prevented?, 
Vᴏɪᴄᴇ ᴏғ Aᴍᴇʀɪᴄᴀ Nᴇᴡs, Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-a-2002-03-02-2-
could-67562967/ 388143.html. The ongoing failed status of the state of Somalia is another example. 
Joint Task Force, the multilateral humanitarian effort to provide relief from the ongoing civil war in 
Somalia, was all but abandoned after the Battle of Mogadishu, or the “Black Hawk Down incident.” 
What a Downed Black Hawk in Somalia Taught America, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Rᴀᴅɪᴏ, Oct. 5, 2013, 
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/05/229561805/what-a-downed-black-hawk-in-somalia-taught-america. The 
complete withdrawal of all U.S. and U.N. troops from Somalia occurred the following year, and the 
civil war in Somalia rages to this day with no end in sight. One Man, No Vote, Tʜᴇ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪsᴛ, Sept. 
26, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21665950-somalia-has-been-attempting 
-build-government-2007-it-proving-impossible-hold-fully. Moreover, humanitarian crises in other 
areas of the world have been completely passed over by humanitarian intervention. The civil war in the 
Congo has caused the deaths of nearly 5.4 million people from 1998 to 2008, mainly from disease and 
starvation, making it the deadliest conflict since World War II. Joe Bavier, Congo War-Driven Crisis 
Kills 45,000 a Month: Study, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2008/01/22/us-
congo-democratic-death-idUSL2280201220080122. For a summary of the U.N.’s response to the 
unrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1994 see Crisis in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibility 
toprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc (last visited Oct. 20 2015). No humanitarian intervention 
has materialized in response to the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan from 2003 to the present day, 
despite the crisis in Darfur having received significant international attention, at least in its initial 
years, and having prompted an intense debate over whether Darfur atrocities constitute “genocide.” 
Darfur May Change the Way We Understand Genocide, CENTER ON L. AND GLOBALIZATION, Sept. 1, 
2015, https://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=172. A civil war in South Sudan, a new 
state in North-East Africa formed by secession from Sudan in 2011, continues as of this writing, 
abated by minimal U.N. humanitarian resources. See generally Daniel Howden, South Sudan: The 
State that Fell Apart in a Week, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 23, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week. 
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redoubling of resources toward the end of humanitarian intervention, and 
perhaps institutional reform. 
The second point of view may be termed a “state-sovereigntist” 
critique. Most notably expounded in the early twenty-first century by 
China and Russia, this view holds that any intervention in the internal 
affairs of another sovereign nation is unjustifiable and illegal under 
international law for the simple reason that it constitutes a war of 
aggression, the original “crime against peace.”11 Humanitarian 
catastrophes are a result of a failure in a country’s political system that 
outside powers can only succeed in complicating, not rectifying. Even 
more sinisterly, in this view, humanitarian intervention may amount to 
little more than a pretext for regime change. The best solution, for state-
sovereigntists, is to simply allow domestic political crises to play 
themselves out, no matter the humanitarian costs. Some room remains for 
outside powers to influence events, for example by attempting to broker a 
peace treaty.
 
This sovereignty-based critique clashes directly with the 
recently adopted doctrine of humanitarian intervention known as the 
Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”).12 
 
 
 11. The state-sovereigntist argument that a humanitarian intervention can, in and of itself, 
constitute a “war of aggression” or a “crime against peace” might have some ironic appeal, since it 
would mean any intervening nations would have to violate international law in order to halt violations 
of international law. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/390-
550006?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). “Crimes against peace,” defined as “the planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression” is the first crime listed under Nuremberg 
Principle IV, beforeboth “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.” This ordering suggests that 
“crimes against peace” may constitute an even more serious violation of international law than either 
war crimes or crimes against humanity; the initiation of an aggressive war, after all, may cause 
precisely the social disruption and political instability which allows both war crimes and crimes 
against humanity to take place. One counter to this charge is that the mission of humanitarian 
intervention is not to conquer or to exploit, but rather to save lives, and in most cases the intervening 
nations indeed intend to end the mission as quickly as possible and bring the troops home. Indeed, a 
major concern is that intervening countries will withdraw force before the humanitarian mission is 
completely fulfilled. See Stephen Wertheim, A Solution From Hell: The United States and the Rise of 
Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991–2003, 12 J. GENOCIDE RES. 149, 149–72 (2010). 
 12. Formally endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005, this theory came to be known as 
the “Responsibility to Protect,” or “R2P” for short. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–40 (Oct. 24, 2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20 
Document.pdf#page=30. This “Responsibility” consists of “three pillars” which perform two major 
functions. In the first pillar, R2P re-conceptualized state sovereignty, traditionally understood as an 
absolute right of sovereign states, into a privilege contingent upon the state’s ability to “protect its 
populations.” Id. ¶ 138. Protection was owed to citizens, in particular, from the four elucidated crimes 
of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See generally The 
Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/ 
adviser/responsibility.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). In the second pillar, R2P announces the role 
of the “international community” in preventing atrocities, turning what was formerly understood as a 
“right” of states to intervene into a “responsibility,” entrusted to the international community at large, 
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A third perspective may be termed “realist” and is somewhat of a 
midway point between the two viewpoints just described. Realists would 
agree with liberal-internationalists that humanitarian goals are both 
legitimate and worthwhile and that they may be legal under international 
law if certain conditions are met. Many realists would also agree with 
state-sovereigntists, however, that intervention can often prove to be an 
ineffective means of shaping political dynamics on the ground to truly 
achieve humanitarian outcomes.
13
 If the conditions abroad are not 
 
 
to “encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility [to protect].” Id. In the event that such 
encouraging and preventive measures prove insufficient, becomes, in the Third Pillar, a 
“responsibility” to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect populations 
from these crimes.” Id. While R2P thus articulated emphasizes peaceful methods of crisis solving, its 
reference to “other means” presumably also includes the use of military force. 
R2P thus sets forth a new “framework” for conceptualizing and justifying humanitarian 
intervention. However, many important aspects are left undefined in the application of R2P. One of 
these is the vagueness of the actors to whom the responsibility to protect is entrusted. In the theory of 
R2P, if a sovereign state fails to uphold its responsibility to protect its citizens from one of the four 
elucidated crimes (genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity), then this 
responsibility to protect reverts to “the international community.” Id. Of course, in practice, not every 
single country in the international community will commit soldiers, equipment, or financial support to 
the cause of intervention. In Libya, the only case thus far in which R2P was evoked, the coalition of 
intervening countries was relatively small—a select group of NATO members plus some members of 
the Arab League. Palash Ghosh, Almost Half of All NATO Members Not Offering Any Military Support 
to Campaign, INT. BUS. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/almost-half-nato-
members-not-offering-any-military-support-libya-campaign-280199. Should R2P be raised again as a 
justification for armed humanitarian intervention, getting all coalition members to contribute their fair 
share of military resources will likely again be at issue. Despite human rights abuses within Russia and 
China, it is highly doubtful that any humanitarian or R2P-style intervention would ever be attempted 
within these great powers, equipped as they are with a nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, the R2P 
doctrine sits uncomfortably with Russia and China. Michael Ignatieff, “How Syria Divides the 
World,” NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 11, 2012, available at http://www.nybooks.com/ 
blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/11/syria-proxy-war-russia-china/. To understand why, consider how the R2P 
doctrine jeopardizes a repressive regime facing an armed rebellion. If the regime responds too 
forcefully to the rebellion, then it may be accused of committing atrocity crimes. However, if the 
regime does not respond forcefully enough to the rebellion, then the conflict can simmer, exposing the 
regime’s failure to “protect its population.” Either way, the R2P framework subjects the regime to 
additional international scrutiny, even if outside intervention is not a realistic option. The threat which 
R2P poses to non-nuclear armed regimes is even starker. If the R2P doctrine becomes sufficiently 
robust, rebel groups themselves can stage assaults designed to provoke retaliation by the regime, with 
the expectation that the regime’s crackdown will be punished by the international community’s timely 
intervention. Alan J. Kuperman, Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons 
from Economics, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 221 (2008). This threat of outside intervention 
constrains the political power not so much of China and Russia themselves, but of Russia and China’s 
authoritarian allies in unstable parts of the world in which Russia and China maintain significant 
economic ties. In addition, the Russian intervention in response to the Maidan (“square”) protests in 
Ukraine and China’s tacit pro-Russian stance in the Ukraine crisis suggest that the post-Cold War 
“triumph of democracy” is far from certain. Gangzheng She, “An unexpected harvest: China, Ukraine 
and the west,” OPENDEMOCRACY.ORG, Aug. 4, 2014, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/ 
gangzheng-she/unexpected-harvest-china-ukraine-and-west. 
 13. For a discussion of the similarities of realism and liberal-internationalism, see Realism, 
Liberalism and Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Middle Ground?, London School of Economics 
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favorable—and if the political will at home is lacking—then realists would 
say that it is best not to try intervention at all. The realist perspective thus 
separates the moral imperative to prevent atrocities from the ability to do 
so in a way that upsets liberal-internationalist assumptions but which may 
also be better tailored to a framework designed for the twenty-first century 
geopolitical system and socio-political milieu. 
Geopolitics helps explain why the 1990s were the high-water mark for 
humanitarian intervention. The end of the Cold War had generated a sense 
of optimism for a world characterized by fewer conflicts, increased great-
power cooperation, and the apparently inevitable progress and eventual 
triumph of liberal democracy.
14
 The luxury of pursuing humanitarian goals 
in other countries through military means was a unique product of this 
“unipolar moment.”15 A budget-conscious American government 
implemented a modest drawdown in military spending throughout the 
 
 
and Political Science, available at http://iars.org.uk/sites/default/files/2007_Research%20Essay_%20 
Humanitarian%20Intervention.pdf. Steven E. Meyer, Security Council Resolution 1244—Everyone’s 
Favorite Crutch, TRANSCONFLICT (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:04 AM), available at http://www.transconflict. 
com/2013/03/security-council-resolution-1244-everyones-favorite-crutch-113/. Fifteen years after the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, a lasting political settlement between Serbia and Kosovo remains 
elusive. 
 14. In a speech before a joint session of Congress shortly prior to the Persian Gulf War, George 
H.W. Bush proclaimed the hope for a “New World Order” wherein America would pursue its national 
interests within a framework of cooperation with the international community. President Bush’s words 
are worth quoting at length:  
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave 
as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of 
these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer 
from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for 
peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper 
and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, 
while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is 
struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the 
rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the 
weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other 
leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this 
crisis today could shape the future for generations to come. 
George H.W. Busch, President, United States of America, Address before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit (Sept. 11, 1990), available at 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9.  
 15. Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 23, 26 (1990), available 
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044692?seq=4.The disintegration of the USSR, the United States’ 
primary geopolitical adversary, caused the well-trained and well-funded American military to 
suddenly find itself, like the proverbial bachelor, all dressed up, with nowhere to go. Yet signs of the 
coming loss of America’s unipolar freedom were apparent even from the beginning. In the run-up to 
the Persian Gulf War, arguably the height of the “unipolar moment,” American secretaries could still 
be found crisscrossing the globe “rattling tin cups” to fund American intervention abroad. Id. 
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1990s;
16
 nevertheless, in this period the U.S. still enjoyed overwhelming 
military might, as it no longer faced the rivalry of the USSR. Meanwhile, 
in the 1990s serious ethnic conflicts manifested around the world. One 
motivation for the abnormally high number of U.S. interventions during 
this decade may have been a desire among some policymakers to turn this 
unprecedented freedom in American military commitments into a force for 
good, or even to see a return for the investment.
17
 
Geopolitics also explains why the appetite for humanitarian 
intervention has since receded. The rise of terrorism as a national security 
threat since 9/11, dismay over the costs of nation-building in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the relative decline in the power of the U.S. have all 
combined to produce a reluctance among NATO members to intervene in 
foreign conflicts.
18
 The chaotic denouement of the Libyan intervention, a 
limited military action against a long-maligned dictator involving no 
Western ground presence,
19
 was in some ways the final straw. Now, it is 
difficult to imagine the United States and its allies summoning the appetite 
for intervention for any goals not directly related to their own national 
(especially security) interests. Indeed, the U.S. very publicly declined to 
pursue a norm-enforcement action in Syria in 2013 when faced with 
 
 
 16. Dinah Walker, “Trends in U.S. Military Spending,” Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏɴ Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Rᴇʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs, July 15, 
2014, http://www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-us-military-spending/p28855. 
 17. Ann Markusen, How We Lost the Peace Dividend, THE AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 19, 2001), 
available at http://prospect.org/article/how-we-lost-peace-dividend. President George H.W. Bush and 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher spoke of a “peace dividend,” a concept related to the guns-and-
butter economic theory. Rɪᴛᴄʜɪᴇ Oᴠᴇɴᴅᴀʟᴇ, Bʀɪᴛɪsʜ Dᴇғᴇɴᴄᴇ Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ sɪɴᴄᴇ 1945, 15 (1994). Less 
money spent on “guns” (i.e. military) would equal more money for “butter,” or projects to improve 
human well-being (i.e. infrastructure, health care, education, etc.). See Guns and Butter Curve, 
Iɴᴠᴇsᴛᴏᴘᴇᴅɪᴀ, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gunsandbutter.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
Military spending in the United States over the 1990s was reduced, albeit at a very slow rate, declining 
to only 85% of the Cold War average by 2001, when the 9/11 terrorist attacks once again fueled 
military spending. See Markusen, supra 14. For a non-scholarly treatment of the “peace dividend” 
from the perspective of the isolationist thinking now on the ascendancy in America and elsewhere, see 
Patrick Foy, How We Squandered the Peace Dividend, TAKI’S MAGAZINE, May 6, 2011, available at 
http://takimag.com/article/how_we_squandered_the_peace_dividend/print#axzz3IR41DCpj. 
 18. Josh Rogin, “NATO chief: Intervention just won’t work in Syria,” Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Aғғᴀɪʀs (Feb. 29, 
2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/29/nato-chief-intervention-just-wont-work-in-syria/. In 
addition, rising powers such as China and Brazil have had to reckon with NATO’s newfound 
reluctance to intervene. Kerry Brown, Why China Misses the Unipolar Moment, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 
17, 2013), available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/why-china-misses-the-unipolar-moment-2/. 
The recent rise in NATO reluctance to pursue humanitarian intervention has, in turn, foisted upon 
other global powers the undesirable onuses of responsibility, action, and criticism that comes with the 
territory of global leadership.  
 19.  Thom Shankar & Eric Schmidt, Seeing Limits to ‘New’ Kind of War in Syria, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, 
Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/nato-war-in-libya-shows-united-
states-was-vital-to-toppling-qaddafi.html?_r=0. 
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revelations concerning the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons on 
civilians.
20
  
Even the once-sacrosanct justification of national security for 
intervention is increasingly being viewed with a jaundiced eye by a 
skeptical public. For example, President Obama’s current “half-hearted 
fight” against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a brutal terrorist 
group which beheaded two American journalists in widely publicized 
propaganda videos, arguably demonstrates the United States’ drift toward 
non-interventionism even in the face of direct provocations.
21
 If the United 
States is reluctant to intervene to protect even its own citizens abroad, then 
what hope do foreign nationals have of eliciting humanitarian 
intervention? 
B. Humanitarian Intervention in a Multipolar World? 
The ‘unipolar moment’ of the 1990s has passed, and the high frequency 
of humanitarian intervention during that decade, juxtaposed with the 
infrequency of such missions today, suggests that decade was a temporary 
deviation from the norm rather than a new permanent state.
22
 Beginning in 
the 2000s, other priorities, chiefly terrorism and global security, have 
assumed center stage.
23
 This development has come dismayingly for those 
 
 
 20 . See Glenn Kessler, President Obama and the ‘red line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/wp/2013/09/ 06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/. 
 21. Mr. Obama’s Half-Hearted Fight Against the Islamic State, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2014, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-obamas-half-hearted-fight-against-the-
islamic-state/2014/10/24/77d7a74c-5b8f-11e4-b812-38518ae74c67_story.html. 
 22. Krauthammer, supra note 15.  
 23. Decades of Western “meddling” in the Middle East may or may not have been the root cause 
of all that region’s current instability. Jeremy Corbyn: ISIL Is Result of Western Meddling in the 
Middle East, SPUTNIK NEWS, Sept. 27, 2015, available at http://sputniknews.com/world/ 
20150927/1027598994.html. Regardless of this argument’s empirical truth, its potent appeal to 
Western liberals cannot be denied. Bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America,’ THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2002, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver. Western intervention’s 
close association with inspiring further terrorism against the West—especially 9/11—militates against 
the U.S. pursuing all but the most essential military actions in the Middle East. Becoming the 
unwitting instigator of further instability in Islamic world is certainly not a U.S. goal, and if the U.S. is 
presented with a choice between a repressive regime and chaos, the choice is clear, even for presidents 
concerned with human rights. For example, when presented with the opportunity to intervene against 
the Assad regime in Syria in 2013, Obama demurred, despite his strong interest in halting atrocity 
crimes in Syria, especially those involving the use of chemical weapons, which Obama had previously 
described as a “red line.” Patrice Taddonio, “The President Blinked”: Why Obama Changed Course 
on the “Red Line” in Syria, FRONTLINE, May 25, 2015, available at http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/obama-at-war/the-president-blinked-why-obama-changed-course-on-
the-red-line-in-syria/. The subsequent rise of ISIS as a major faction in Syria in 2014 has perhaps 
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who have held out hope for humanitarian intervention to assist many parts 
of the world in the transition towards liberal democracy.
24
 Understanding 
the stubborn persistence of repressive regimes, and the chaos that so often 
follows their downfalls, presents new challenges to political scientists and 
advocates of humanitarianism. 
In a speech on the eve of Operation Desert Storm, American president 
George H.W. Bush set forth his concept of a “New World Order,” wherein 
the United States would enjoy a hegemonic position but simultaneously 
work with other nations to cooperate to pursue peace and other mutual 
interests. This speech was very much a product of its time, and Bush’s 
optimistic vision has not come to pass. Instead, as the United States’ 
relative power has declined, the world order has increasingly veered 
toward a more cutthroat and competitive contest for global influence not 
unlike the familiar Westphalian rivalries of the 18th and 19th centuries.
25
 
 
 
vindicated Obama’s much-maligned decision not to retaliate against the Assad regime for its war 
crimes; but at the same time, the decision to stand aside did nothing to halt the rise of ISIS. 
 24. At a minimum, humanitarian intervention must bring about some degree of protection and 
stability to the affected populations in order for the mission to be regarded as a success. Unqualified 
success is elusive, and recently examples of even mixed success are also difficult to identify. In 
addition, achievement of short-term goals is not necessarily indicative of long-term success. As an 
example, consider the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, the first humanitarian intervention to 
be explicitly justified in terms of R2P. The Crisis in Libya, INT’L. COALITION FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/ 
crisis-in-libya. The timely use of NATO force succeeded in achieving President Obama’s most 
immediate humanitarian aim, preventing the government troops of the Libyan strongman Col. 
Muammar Gaddafi from entering Benghazi and massacring his own people. Remarks by the President 
in Address to the Nation on Libya, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Mar. 28 
2011, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-
address-nation-libya. The Libyan dictator himself had brashly threatened atrocity crimes, calling 
protesters “cockroaches” and threatening to “cleanse Libya house by house,” language reminiscent of 
the anti-Tutsi rhetoric preceding the Rwandan genocide. John Leyne, Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi 
refuses to quit, BBC Nᴇᴡs, Feb. 22, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
12544624. In the long-term, however, the Libyan intervention failed to achieve lasting stability. Likely 
informed by recent negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the NATO coalition made little 
attempt at nation building in Libya. As of this writing, Libya is divided between two rival governments 
stationed in the east and west and smaller groups of armed tribal factions, a chaotic situation not unlike 
Somalia. Rebecca Murray, Libya Anniversary: ‘The Situation is Just Terrible’, AL-JAZEERA, Feb. 16, 
2015, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/libya-anniversary-situation-terrible-1502 
16082028555.html. It is difficult to say whether life for average Libyans is better than it would have 
been if Gaddafi had been allowed to remain in power.  
 25. In support of this note’s contention that an increasingly multipolar world will witness the 
return of Westphalian rivalries among nation-states, note the generally low level of trust between 
nations in multilateral contexts. Despite some recent progress, the Doha round at the WTO remains 
stalled on the main issue of agriculture. Doha Delivers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/12/world-trade-organisation. Multilateral efforts 
to combat climate change continue, but have run aground before, and are complicated by recent 
revelations concerning China’s increased consumption of coal. Chris Buckley, China Burns Much 
More Coal Than Reported, Complicating Climate Talks, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, Nov. 3, 2015, 
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The return of national-interest calculations under this more competitive 
global arrangement threatens to push humanitarian concerns to the side 
once again, as was the case during the Cold War. At worst, nation-states 
may return to the Cold War practice of intervention for narrow 
geopolitical reasons, and the multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) character 
of the twenty-first-century world order would complicate matters further. 
To preserve humanitarian goals in the coming multipolar world, liberal 
internationalists will need to devise a new framework for equitably 
shouldering the costs of humanitarian missions. No less important would 
be forging a consensus among nations with a stake in the world order to 
equitably share the credit (and the blame) for the outcomes of those 
missions. 
II. WHO SHALL INTERVENE? DEFINING THE “INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY” IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 
Recent history has not been kind to the concept of intervention. Most 
notably, the costly and prolonged occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan 
have helped contributed to an increase in isolationism.
26
 Good intentions 
do not appear to matter; Western nations, the United States included, are 
more reluctant than ever to engage in intervention for any reason. Neither 
the Iraq nor Afghanistan Wars were, strictly speaking, humanitarian 
interventions, but they were billed as “liberating operations” for the local 
 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/china-burns-much-more-coal-than-reported-complicating 
-climate-talks.html. Nuclear proliferation remains a major challenge, especially in South Asia. The 
Editorial Board, The Pakistan Nuclear Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2015, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/the-pakistan-nuclear-nightmare.html. What all these failures share in 
common is an unwillingness of states to agree to accept limitations on their own sovereignty and 
perceived national interests in order to obtain a global public good. These failures can be characterized 
as a prisoner’s dilemma writ large, where countries pursue a temporarily self-interested, but ultimately 
self-defeating, strategy of continually ratting on one another. Examples of recent multilateral 
successes, such as the recent agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP), arguably have 
deeper roots in regional rivalries. Adrian Hearn and Margaret Myers, China and the TPP: Asia-Pacific 
Integration or Disintegration?, THE DIALOGUE.ORG, July 2015, http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/CLA-TPP-Report-final-web.pdf.According to U.S. officials, deepening ties 
within the trade bloc would assist in presenting an effective counterweight to China’s regional pull 
within East Asia, an argument which has caused consternation in China. Min Ye, China Liked TPP—
Until U.S. Officials Opened Their Mouths, FOREIGN POLICY, May 15, 2015, available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-liked-trans-pacific-partnership-until-u-s-officials-opened-
their-mouths-trade-agreement-rhetoric-fail/. 
 26. Max Fisher, American Isolationism Just Hit a 50-year Record High. Why That Matters, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/ 
2013/12/04/american-isolationism-just-hit-a-50-year-high-why-that-matters/. 
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population, in addition to being essential for U.S. national security.
27
 The 
repressive human rights record of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan—as 
well as the eagerness of the Bush Administration to justify the Iraq War as 
humanitarianism in the face of withering criticism over faulty pre-war 
intelligence concerning WMDs—has confused this distinction between 
humanitarian and non-humanitarian intervention for many.
28
 
Perhaps even more damaging to the reputation of humanitarian 
intervention than the Iraq or Afghanistan Wars was the 2011 Libyan 
intervention. Unlike the Bush Administration’s post-hoc use of 
humanitarianism to justify the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, which both 
retained an independent national security justification, the Obama 
Administration justified the 2011 Libyan intervention from day one solely 
as a humanitarian exercise pursuant to R2P.
29
 This intervention, while 
undoubtedly effective in the short-term at saving lives from the Gaddafi 
regime, over the long-term shattered any semblance of Libyan governance 
and by most accounts has left the country “in tatters.”30 The upshot of 
these interventions is that the United States, while still militarily supreme, 
has become much less confident in its own ability to achieve favorable 
political outcomes through the use of force. The Bush and Blair 
Administrations’ confused and misguided use of humanitarian rhetoric to 
separately justify the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars has also tarnished 
American legitimacy. The project of preserving and promoting liberal 
democracy—a cornerstone of American foreign policy since at least 
World War I—saw impressive gains in the twentieth century, but twenty-
first century experience with the democratizing project has so far been 
mostly negative.
31
 The United States remains a top military power 
committed to democracy and human rights, and will likely be a major 
player in any future humanitarian interventions, but the supposed excesses 
of American unilateral action is hardly the concern anymore. Rather, the 
 
 
 27. Editorial, Liberating the Women of Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/24/opinion/liberating-the-women-of-afghanistan.html. 
 28. A.M. Johannessen, Humanitarian Intervention and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after 
September 11, WIKIDOT, July 3, 2008, available at http://amjohannes.wikidot.com/humanitarian-
intervention-and-the-responsibility-to-protect. 
 29. Chris Keeler, The End of the Responsibility to Protect?, FOREIGN POL’Y J., Oct. 12, 2011, 
available at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/12/the-end-of-the-responsibility-to-
protect/. 
 30. Mohamed Ali Harissi, Libya in tatters after bloody year of rival governments, YAHOO! 
NEWS, Aug. 25, 2015, available at http://news.yahoo.com/libya-tatters-bloody-rival-governments-
1024087 84.html. 
 31. Michael Mandelbaum, Civics Class: A Report Card on This Country’s Efforts to Teach Other 
Countries About Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, available at https://www.nytimes.com/ 
books/99/12/12/reviews/991212.12mandelt.html.  
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focus must shift to building a new “international community” in support of 
humanitarian intervention, one that includes other actors. 
Post-Nuremburg, the “international community” entrusted with pursing 
humanitarian interventions is formally the whole community of nations as 
embodied in the U.N. In practice, however, and certainly since the end of 
the Cold War, the “international community” has served as a euphemism 
for the United States, NATO, and other closely aligned nations such as 
Australia.
32
 The United States and its allies, however, have tried their role 
as the “world’s policeman” and are quickly losing the appetite to intervene 
in humanitarian crises that have no direct bearing on their direct national 
interests or security.
33
 This “international community” in favor of 
humanitarian intervention has fractured, but a new one may yet be born. 
In an increasingly multipolar world, it is conceivable that more nations 
may join to form a more inclusive international community. Many nations 
are increasing in relative power, both economically and militarily, 
including the BRIC countries.
34
 The European Union, catalyzed by 
Russian aggression in Ukraine, may also move towards a more unified 
foreign policy with goals that may diverge from those of the NATO 
alliance.
35
 So the “rise of the rest”36 will witness the gradual leveling of 
American power with that of other great powers. Each new bloc of power 
 
 
 32. Australia and New Zealand have led humanitarian interventions in the Pacific Islands region, 
including notably in East Timor. Alan A. Lachica, Humanitarian Intervention in East Timor: An 
Analysis of Australia’s Leadership Role, PEACE & CONFLICT REV. Vᴏʟ. 5, 2 (Spring 2011). 
 33. See generally Barbara Conroy, U.S. Global Leadership: A Euphemism for World Policeman, 
CATO INSTITUTE, Feb. 5, 1997, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html. 
 34. The “BRIC” grouping of four countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will soon become 
wealthier than most of the current economic powers. Once heralded as the future of the twenty-first 
century global economy, these countries’ growth rates began to slow in 2013 and Brazil, Russia, and 
China all experienced major economic shocks in 2014 and 2015. Emerging Economies: When Giants 
Slow Down, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/ 
21582257-most-dramatic-and-disruptive-period-emerging-market-growth-world-has-ever-seen. 
 35. European Parliament Urges United Front on Russia, Eᴜʀᴀsɪᴀɴᴇᴛ.ᴏʀg, June 10, 2015, 
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73811. 
 36.  Zakaria, Fareed. The Rise of the Rest, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 2008, available at 
http://fareedzakaria.com/2008/05/12/the-rise-of-the-rest/. The E.U.’s role will depend on whether and 
how European Union integration progresses, a question which, now more than ever, has no easily 
ascertainable answer. The prolonged Euro crisis, as well as the recent electoral successes of 
Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament both suggest that the E.U. may be incapable of 
operating a coherent foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Björn Fägersten, The Ukraine Crisis has 
Highlighted the Flaws in the EU’s Technocratic Approach to Foreign Policy, May 8, 2014, available 
at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/05/08/the-ukraine-crisis-has-highlighted-the-flaws-in-the-
eus-technocratic-approach-to-foreign-policy/. European nations that remain capable of participating in 
their sovereign capacity as major partners in humanitarian intervention would be Britain, France, and 
Germany. Minor European nations would still be capable of contributing modest troop levels, 
logistical support, and of course helping bestow the all-important quality of international legitimacy 
upon any military action.  
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represents potential rivals for geopolitical influence with the United States. 
Yet each potential rival is also a potential partner, and there are powerful 
reasons to cooperate. Globalization has deepened the incentives for nations 
to have good bilateral relations, especially regarding trade and national 
security. The global implications of climate change have anchored much 
discussion on multilateral cooperation in the twenty-first century, even if 
solutions have not yet materialized. Even the barbarity of Jihadism, as 
embodied in ISIS, has the potential to bring former rivals closer together, 
especially Iran and the United States.
37
 Humanitarian intervention is 
another area that would benefit from a global conception of responsibility. 
In a best-case scenario (a “cooperative world”), humanitarian intervention 
may become regarded as another ‘global good’ that is the proper 
responsibility of all nations with a stake in the international order.
38
 
In a worst-case scenario (a “competitive world”), however, 
intervention—whether or not coupled with the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism—may return to become another tool for the world’s 
strongest states to advance their own narrow national interests, as was the 
case during the Cold War.
39
 In the competition for the world’s attention, 
there will be “winners” and “losers.” Sub-Saharan Africa, where few 
nations outside the African continent have vital interests, would be a 
“loser,” and conflicts there would likely slip further from view as nations 
choose to conserve their military resources and political capital rather than 
invest them in an attempt to resolve the humanitarian crisis.
40
  
 
 
 37. Benny Avni, Iran Says It’s Willing to Fight ISIS, for a Price, NEWSSWEEK, Sept. 29, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/iran-says-its-willing-fight-isis-price-273939. 
 38. A “global public good” has no easy definition, but generally means any good available on a 
worldwide, non-excludable basis;this includes efforts to address climate change, improve global public 
health, eradicate infectious diseases, and distribute beneficial technologies such as cellphones on a 
wider basis. Shaffer, Gregory, International Law and Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 23 
EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 3, 669–93 (2012), available at http://ejil.oxford journals.org/content/23/3/669. 
To the extent that humanitarian intervention often specifically seeks to develop these areas, as well as 
others such as democracy and institution-building, humanitarian intervention could also be considered 
a global public good. Id. 
 39. The Five Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council consist of the United States, 
China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. Current Members, Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴs Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ 
Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/. These countries were the victors of World 
War II (with the exception of Russia, which inherited the seat formerly held by the USSR). One 
criticism of the U.N. Security Council is that this collection of nations has become outdated. Editorial, 
Reforming the UN Security Council: Manana, Manana, THE GUARDIAN, May 6, 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/06/un-security-council.  
 40. For an assessment of post-Cold War U.S. interests in Africa, see Dan Henk, US National 
Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, Parameters, Winter 1997–98, 92–107, available at 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/97winter/henk.htm. Henk suggests 
that U.S. responses to humanitarian crises in Africa are “hasty” and poorly thought-through because 
humanitarianism is low on the list of U.S. national security priorities. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/9
  
 
 
 
 
2016] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 179 
 
 
 
 
Yet, in a competitive world, the fate of the “winners” could be even 
worse. Conflicts in more geo-strategically significant areas, such as 
Eastern Europe or the Middle East, would assume greater significance, but 
also, paradoxically, become even more difficult to address, at least under 
the current system. It is already extremely difficult to obtain a consensus 
from all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in favor of 
intervention, and this would become even more difficult if any of the five 
permanent members decide to use their veto powers to block humanitarian 
interventions aimed against friendly regimes.
41
 A version of this process is 
already underway. For example, the Syrian regime’s loudly-voiced 
importance to Russia, and Russia’s recent intervention therein, seem to 
have scuttled any possibility of a U.N.-approved humanitarian intervention 
in the Syrian civil war.
42
 The alternative, multilateral diplomacy, has not 
yet produced an acceptable solution in Syria, and the humanitarian 
situation there has since gone from bad to worse.
43
 Shockingly, the Assad 
regime has somehow managed to successfully bill itself as the sane man in 
the room compared to the rebel groups, especially ISIS. From a Western 
perspective, it is not even clear what policies a Syrian intervention would 
be designed to achieve; no other global conflict more vexingly pits 
humanitarianism against national security. 
A. R2P—International Law versus Application 
Humanitarian intervention is conceptually grounded in international 
law deriving from the Nuremburg Tribunals. Genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing are considered such serious 
transgressions that all options, ranging from economic sanctions to 
 
 
 41. Russian and Chinese U.N. Security Council vetoes succeeded in blocking proposed U.N. 
actions to address the Syrian conflict, including the decision to refer Syria to the International Criminal 
Court. Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal Court, 
THE GUARDIAN, May 22, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-
china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court. Individual nations or, more 
likely, regional security organizations such as NATO may, of course, for better or worse, choose to 
launch humanitarian interventions in spite of a veto by a permanent member of the U.N. Security 
Council, as was the case in Kosovo in 1999. Jack Goldsmith, More on the UN Charter, Syria, and 
“Illegal but Legitimate,” LAWFARE, Sept. 5, 2013, https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-un-charter-
syria-and-illegal-legitimate The legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council as a tool for authorizing 
humanitarian intervention would be damaged in such an event. 
 42. Jon Schuppe, Russian Aggression Complicates Obama’s Options in Syria, Bᴜsɪɴᴇss Iɴsɪᴅᴇʀ, 
Oct. 9, 2015, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/russian-aggression-complicates -
obamas-options-syria-n441061. 
 43. Syria Crisis: Echo Factsheet, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Sept. 14, 2015, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf. 
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military intervention, should be considered to prevent them from 
occurring. The recent advent of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
(R2P) has explicitly conditioned a state’s sovereignty upon the state’s 
responsibilities to protect its own citizens from such crimes, and this 
evolving doctrine provides guidance in determining when military 
intervention may be appropriate.
44
 The decision to intervene in any 
particular case can never be entirely separated from political concerns, 
including a country’s diplomatic ties to the regime.45 But even when the 
decision to intervene is made, pursuing humanitarian intervention is not as 
clear-cut as enforcing other international obligations, as, for example, an 
International Court of Justice judgment. First, states who are targets of 
humanitarian intervention often have little incentive to cooperate, 
especially when the regime itself is implicated in the humanitarian crisis. 
Second, enforcement in this context also requires expending significant 
monetary and military costs. Finally, the domestic political situation must 
be favorable for intervention, and, when coalition-building is involved, an 
effort must be made to accommodate foreign policy perspectives among 
the world’s major powers that differ fundamentally. 
Even if all of the aforementioned considerations can be addressed, a 
curious paradox remains. The intervening nation (or coalition of nations) 
often wields superior force, but this is no guarantee of the mission’s 
ultimate success.
46
 It seems clear that humanitarian interventions can save 
lives, but for how long? No country will volunteer to police a foreign 
conflict indefinitely, especially one that does not directly impact its core 
 
 
 44. See generally INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/. 
 45. For discussion of the practical limitations of Responsibility to Protect, see generally Lou 
Pigenot and Wolfgang Obenland, In Whose Name?: A Critical View on the Responsibility to Protect. 
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, May 2014, available at https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/ 
pdfs/In_whose_name_web.pdf. 
 46. Generally speaking, humanitarian interventions involve a great mismatch of military strength 
in favor of the intervening nation or nations. However, when the intervening countries are 
democratically ruled (as is generally the case), military force alone is not enough. In the democratic 
West, the issue of whether to use force in foreign nations is one of the most salient and controversial 
issues of foreign policy. So if a humanitarian intervention lasts more than one election cycle, then the 
electorate must continue to support the intervention, or it may elect a government opposed to the 
intervention. In particular, public opinion in support of humanitarian intervention can wane over the 
course of a prolonged occupation or even shift dramatically after a single military defeat. Benjamin 
Valentino, The Perils of Limited Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the 1990s, 24 WIS. L.J. 3, 
723, at 731 (2006), available at http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/wordpress/wilj/files/2012/ 02/valentino.pdf. 
For example, polls indicated that 73 to 81 percent of Americans supported the humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia prior to the Battle of Mogadishu, but after eighteen American soldiers died in 
that battle, 60 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that further involvement in Somalia was 
not “worth the death of even one more soldier.” Id.  
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national interests. The risk that a humanitarian intervention will not 
quickly achieve the optimal outcome—peace that will endure after the 
withdrawal of the intervening force—is surely a factor in world leaders’ 
reluctance to risk their own political capital on humanitarian interventions. 
Any new framework must squarely address this problem.  
Intervening nations, perhaps, should be compensated in some way for 
assuming these risks and expenditures. One way in which such a payback 
may be effective is by allowing nations to pursue national interests in 
tandem with humanitarian objectives. For many nations of the “global 
south,” such accommodation would likely be a non-starter; although 
charges of neo-imperialism are generally overstated, some skepticism 
regarding intervening nations’ true motives is warranted in light of the 
colonial histories of Western nations’ involvement in Africa and the 
Middle East.
47
 Such skepticism merits a response, and concerns that 
humanitarian intervention may pose as a front for neo-colonialism can 
perhaps be met with some version of the following argument. Rather than 
abandoning all responsibility, former colonial powers owe a particular 
duty to mitigate the bad consequences of their colonial legacies, because 
often, instability is a legacy of colonialism.
48
 
Explicitly ratifying the pursuit of national self-interest would also run 
afoul of principles of Christian just-war theory that are sometimes 
advanced in support of humanitarian intervention.
49
 The post-Nuremburg 
moral and philosophical underpinnings of international humanitarian law 
gesture toward universal values and make no attempt to accommodate 
national interests. While victory over Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan 
 
 
 47. The Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention, FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH, available at 
http://focusweb.org/content/crisis-humanitarian-intervention (last accessed Oct. 13, 2015). 
 48.  Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for 
Africa, Working Paper No. 17620, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Nov. 2011), 
available at http://www.freakonomics.com/media/Africa%20paper.pdf . Examples of adverse colonial 
legacies include the practice of artificial border-drawing, exacerbating ethnic tensions, coupled as well 
as the failure to leave behind strong democratic and inclusive political institutions in the wake of 
decolonization. Although all governments ultimately bear a responsibility to foster tolerance and 
pluralism, former colonial powers should be partially responsible to the extent that they failed to 
cultivate such traditions in the countries they created and then left behind. 
 49.  David Mednicoff, Humane wars? International Law, Just War Theory and Contemporary 
Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 2 LAW, CULTURE, AND THE HUMANITIES 373 (2006), available at 
https://people.umass.edu/mednic/justwarfinal06.pdf. Christian just-war theory provides a philosophical 
backbone to the modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention, or “Responsibility to Protect.” Notably, 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its 2001 report 
reiterated the importance to humanitarian intervention of the following four elements derived from 
just-war theory: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success. 
Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect, Dec. 2001, 
available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:161 
 
 
 
 
occasioned the Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials, as well as the establishment 
of the U.N., the allied powers fought World War II for their own reasons, 
ranging from the protection of their own system of government to sheer 
national survival. These reasons were unrelated to the plight of Europe’s 
Jews; indeed, the horrors of the Holocaust were neither fully known nor 
fully believed until the war’s conclusion.50 It may be postulated that, even 
if the extent of the Holocaust were fully known to the allied powers at an 
earlier date, this knowledge would not have provided a sufficient condition 
for war in the absence of other Nazi provocations, such as the invasion of 
Poland in 1939 and the USSR itself in 1941.  
From a practical standpoint, then, intervening nations’ pursuit of such 
national interests should not necessarily be rejected out-of-hand as 
incompatible with the humanitarian goals of intervention. Rather, where 
possible, national interest calculations should be effectively integrated into 
the international law on humanitarian intervention and also used to bolster 
pro-interventionist arguments. Of course, two countries’ conceptions of 
their own national interests in a country where conflict rages may differ 
greatly. In such a case, nations interested in humanitarianism would need 
to strike a delicate balance between the desirability of consensus and the 
dangers of compromise. But if national interests cannot be effectively 
accommodated, then in an increasingly competitive multipolar world, it 
will be more challenging to find any nation willing to volunteer to pursue 
humanitarian intervention. 
B. The Role of the U.N. in a Multipolar World 
We have examined the role of nation-states in humanitarian 
intervention; the United Nation’s role is somewhat different. The U.N. 
may choose to dispatch peacekeeping missions to address conflicts. As of 
this writing, there are 16 such peacekeeping missions ongoing,
51
 although 
this figure is perhaps best understood more as a measure of the 
intractability of certain conflicts than the U.N. peacekeeping missions’ 
own effectiveness. U.N. peacekeeping missions may help marginally 
improve the humanitarian situation on the ground, but they are generally 
not designed or equipped to alter the fundamental strategic situation, let 
 
 
 50. K.C. Gleason, The ‘Holocaust’ and the Failure of Allied and Jewish Responses: The Logic of 
Disbelief, 5 J. HɪSᴛ. Rᴇᴠ. 215 (Winter 1984), available at http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v05/v05p215_ 
Gleason.html. 
 51. Current Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, available at 
http://www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml. 
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alone end conflicts. To this end, the U.N.’s most important role is as a tool 
for authorizing the use of force by nation-states to pursue humanitarian 
intervention. In a multipolar world, the U.N.’s role in this respect will 
continue to be key.  
The U.N. is important as a formal repository of the world’s collective 
opinion and a fount of legitimacy. The 1990s reaffirmed the U.N.’s central 
role in humanitarian intervention. Fresh off the heels of a Cold War 
victory, the United States in the 1990s enjoyed relatively high global 
esteem, and the freedom to pursue any policy it desired, but the United 
States still took care to achieve the U.N.’s backing before pursuing 
humanitarian intervention (with the notable exception of Kosovo).
52
 Much 
of America’s international goodwill has since been lost in the wake of the 
Iraq War; even though the United States assembled a sizeable “coalition of 
the willing” in support of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States 
still received criticism for not obtaining the proper U.N. authorization 
(and, in the eyes of some, actively attempting to deceive the U.N. Security 
Council).
53
 The subsequent troubled occupation of Iraq has helped justify 
these grievances. As such, in a multipolar world, the U.N. will likely be 
even more important to formalizing and legitimizing humanitarian 
interventions. 
As the institutional embodiment of the community of nations, the U.N. 
has always been committed to multilateralism. The General Assembly, the 
nearest thing to a world legislature, was designed as a council of co-equal 
sovereigns, each nation formally vested with the same rights as all 
others.
54
 As such, the U.N. is keen on recognizing and respecting cultural 
and political differences among nations and avoiding favoritism or at least 
the appearance of favoritism.
55
 With regard to humanitarian intervention in 
particular, the U.N. has generally proven highly skeptical of unilateral 
action.
56
 
 
 
 52.  David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 129 
(2001). 
 53. See generally Schwarz, Jonathan. Lie After Lie After Lie: What Colin Powell Knew Ten Years 
Ago Today And What He Said, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 5, 2013, available at http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-schwarz/colin-powell-wmd-iraq-war_b_2624620.html. 
 54.  U.N. Charter Art. 2, §1. 
 55. The U.N. has generally recognized the principle of non-interference in the political affairs of 
other nations, a proposition in tension with humanitarian intervention generally and the Responsibility 
to Protect in particular. See G.A. Res. 50/172, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/172 (Dec. 22, 1995), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/ares50-172.htm.  
 56. Witness the U.N. General Assembly’s condemnations of the interventions of the U.S. and 
USSR in the 1980s, supra note 3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
184 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:161 
 
 
 
 
The ascendancy of multilateral humanitarian interventions during the 
1990s allowed the U.N. to realign itself as a supporter of humanitarian 
interventions. Ironically, the unrivaled military force of the U.S. during the 
1990s made possible—perhaps even necessitated—the U.N.’s shift to 
endorsement of multilateral interventions in order to preserve their 
relevance. That period of “Pax Americana” has since passed, which 
presents the U.N. with both an opportunity and a challenge to redefine its 
attitude toward humanitarian intervention. If the U.N. wishes to preserve 
its commitment to humanitarian intervention in a multipolar world, it must 
squarely address the political and geopolitical factors which motivate 
nation-states’ decisions to pursue humanitarian intervention.  
Owing to its structure, membership, and history, however, the U.N. is 
unlikely to be accommodating to such considerations. First, the U.N. 
Security Council, designed as a kind of world executive branch, has 
become increasingly dysfunctional on the issue of humanitarian 
intervention as the foreign policies of the five permanent members—
especially Russia and China—have become ever more difficult to 
reconcile with one another and with the desirability of humanitarian 
intervention at all.
57
 With such profound disagreement, the P-5 are 
unlikely to agree to any reforms which would revise the unanimity 
requirement for the authorization of force to a more flexible system, such 
as a majority vote, which would make it easier for nations to pursue their 
national interests through humanitarian intervention.  
Second, the vast majority of U.N. member-states are not permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council, and many have voiced 
disagreement with this unequal system. A multipolar world will 
necessarily increase the plausibility of the claim by certain rising powers, 
such as Brazil,
58
 to permanent seats on the Security Council, and more 
permanent members will make obtaining unanimity more difficult. So far, 
the P-5 have been unwilling to extend membership to this exclusive club, 
and until this happens obtaining buy-in from the rising powers in a reform 
of the current system of authorizing humanitarian interventions may prove 
difficult. 
 
 
 57. Julian Borger & Basiten Inzaurralde, US: Russia is Making the UN Security Council 
Dysfunctional, BUSINESS INSIDER, Sept. 23, 2015, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/us-
russia-is-making-the-un-security-council-dysfunctional-2015-9. 
 58.  Oliver Stuenkel, Brazil and UN Security Council Reform: Is It Time for Another Big Push?, 
POST-WESTERN WORLD, June 30, 2015, available at http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/06/ 
30/brazil-and-un-security-council-reform-is-it-time-for-another-big-push/. 
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Third, non-permanent members are also likely to reject any revision of 
the rules that would give the Permanent Members and their close allies, 
the most likely proponents of humanitarian intervention, even more power 
over the process. If the U.N. were to revisit this issue and revise the 
governing framework of humanitarian intervention, the U.N. would be 
more likely to favor stringent rules to prevent those who engage in 
humanitarian intervention from advancing their own national interests 
while doing so. 
Failing to reform the system, however, would be counterproductive 
from the United Nations’ perspective. This is because, unlike during the 
Cold War era, in today’s world, the U.N. appears more concerned about a 
lack of willingness in the international community to conduct 
humanitarian interventions, rather than nations intervening 
overzealously.
59
 In a multipolar world, a dearth of incentives for 
humanitarian intervention will lead to fewer interventions overall. 
Recognizing this dynamic is the first step toward a new U.N. policy of 
humanitarian intervention that can accommodate intervening nations’ 
interests rather than reflexively viewing them with skepticism.  
One creative proposal to address the political difficulties of authorizing 
humanitarian intervention is the creation of a new institution to authorize 
such interventions, a “Court of Human Security.”60 Such an international 
court—comprised of tenured, independent judges hailing from many 
countries—would have advantages, especially avoiding the inherent 
difficulties of the current system of authorizing humanitarian 
interventions, such as the vetoes of the Permanent Members of the U.N. 
 
 
 59. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has become increasingly sophisticated in recent 
years, as evidenced in the development and widespread adoption of the notion of the Responsibility to 
Protect. However, humanitarian intervention has continued to suffer from a lack of resources and 
political will. For example, the international humanitarian intervention in the Rwandan genocide in 
1994 has been widely criticized as inadequate. Lindsey Hilsum, What On Earth Were They Doing?, 
NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAGAZINE, Dec. 1994, http://newint.org/features/1994/12/05/doing/. Many 
deadly conflicts in Africa since then have received little or no response, notably the crisis in Darfur 
which has raged from the early 2000s to today. The Black Commentator, Africa Action: The Tale of 
Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur, TRUTH-OUT.ORG, Aug. 11, 2006, 
http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/65561:africa-action-the-tale-of-two-genocides-the-failed-us-
response-to-rwanda-and-darfur. The early-2010s have seen a further rise in global instability. At the 
time of this writing in 2015, many conflicts around the world are good candidates for humanitarian 
intervention. The international community’s failure to intervene is not doctrinal, but stems from the 
difficulty of the politics surrounding humanitarian intervention. 
 60. Fernando R. Teson, The Vexing Problem of Authority in Humanitarian Intervention: A 
Proposal, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 761, 771–72 (2006). The proposal of an international court to authorize 
the use of force for humanitarian intervention is conceded by its author to be “utopian,” though 
perhaps no less utopian than the idea of an International Court of Justice when it was first proposed. 
See id.  
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Security Council. However, the principle benefit of such a Court—
political independence—could turn to political irrelevance if the countries 
expected to provide humanitarian support distrust the Court’s processes or 
disagree with its judgments. Even more worryingly, nation-states would 
likely balk at any Court’s infringement upon the nation’s decision to wage 
war, one of the most essential capacities of a sovereign state. The 
objection is almost too easy: we refuse to send our sons and daughters into 
battle by decree of an international panel of unelected judges. Such 
skepticism is only likely to increase further in the uncertainty of a 
multipolar world. 
C. Fiscal and Military Constraints in an Age of Austerity 
As has been argued in Part I, the newfound enthusiasm of Western 
nations for humanitarian intervention during the 1990s was both made 
possible and encouraged by the end of the old Cold War bipolar order. 
Another uniquely favorable aspect undergirding the pro-intervention 
consensus of the 1990s is that decade’s healthy economic growth. 
Economic growth in many Western nations, coupled with broad-based 
reductions in overall military spending, made the fiscal costs of 
humanitarian intervention seem less prohibitive. The general prosperity of 
the 1990s had become an aberration, however, by the time of the 2001 
downturn, and certainly by the even more severe 2008/2009 financial 
crisis. This has been especially true in Europe, where the Euro crisis has 
forced the political class to grapple with questions of inter-European 
integration rather than the world beyond Europe, even as that world has 
also grown increasingly unstable. We now live in an “age of austerity” 
where all parts of the budget in Western nations, especially European 
nations, are being closely examined.
61
 Due to a public perception—
 
 
 61. In response to the Euro crisis, and in an attempt to reduce levels of sovereign debt, various 
governments in Europe have implemented a programme of fiscal cutbacks which have been termed 
“austerity.” Alberto Alesina, et al. Europe’s Fiscal Crisis Revealed: An In-Depth Analysis of Spending, 
Austerity, and Growth, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, June 6, 2014, http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2014/06/europes-fiscal-crisis-revealed-an-in-depth-analysis-of-spending-austerity-and-growth# 
chapter1. Discontent with this attempted fix has resulted in the formation of a continental political 
movement against austerity. Thomas Pinketty: Strong Anti-Austerity Parties Are Just What Europe 
Needs, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Jan. 15, 2015, available at http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/ 
01/12/thomas-piketty-strong-anti-austerity-parties-are-just-what-europe-needs. This movement reflects 
anxiety about cuts to public sector spending, including healthcare and pensions. Sarah Leonard, How 
Greece Put an Anti-Austerity, Anti-Capitalist Party in Power, THE NATION, Feb. 18, 2015, available 
at http://www.thenation.com/article/how-greece-put-anti-austerity-anti-capitalist-party-power/. The 
movement tends to view military spending as unnecessary or even wasteful, and in Greece, both anti-
austerity officials and the creditors have reached a rare consensus in identifying military outlays as an 
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deserved or not—that most Westerners now live in an era largely devoid 
of major conventional threats, the military budget can be the first to 
receive the axe.
62
 Voters in western nations, whether liberal or 
conservative, have become more likely to vote for “nation-building at 
home” than for projects of risky, often thankless nation-building abroad.63 
Assuming fiscally-constrained Western nations continue to prove 
unable or unwilling to contribute the necessary resources toward 
humanitarian intervention, then the U.N. may again prove valuable. As 
was previously noted, the U.N., apart from authorizing the use of force, 
can also assist by providing direct support for humanitarian interventions 
through the use of its own peacekeeping forces. This approach brings 
several advantages. The U.N., as the formal embodiment of the 
international community, has a special mantle of legitimacy to pursue 
humanitarian intervention. No one can accuse the U.N. of intervening in 
another nation on behalf of its own narrow national interests, because the 
U.N. by definition is composed of all nations. This avoids the appearance 
of favoritism. 
The U.N. is funded through contributions from its constituent nations, 
out of necessity, and as such the resources for intervention, both fiscal and 
military, will still have to come from the world community at large. The 
age of austerity, thus, is still likely to prove a roadblock in any campaign 
 
 
area to cut in order to restore fiscal balance. The New Sticking Points, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 2015, 
available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/06/greek-bail-out-negotiations. Many 
countries in Europe barely spend enough on the military to credibly protect their own sovereignty, and 
as such it may be folly to expect them to contribute significant resources to humanitarian interventions 
perceived as inessential for their own national security. The anti-austerity debates have revealed that 
citizens in most Western nations generally feel relatively secure from foreign threats, but more 
unsecure about their own financial futures. In an age of austerity, public opinion may still be rallied 
against direct threats to national security, but in this political climate, allocating scarce fiscal resources 
toward humanitarian interventions will likely prove more difficult than ever. The intensifying migrant 
crisis in Europe, however, may provide an opportunity for Europeans to reflect on how failure to 
address humanitarian crises in faraway lands can hit closer to home. Philip Sherwell & Nick Squires, 
‘Migrant Crisis is a Security Crisis’ Says EU Foreign Policy Chief, THE TELEGRAPH, May 11, 2015, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/europe/eu/11597651/Migrant-crisis-is-a-
security-crisis-says-EU-foreign-policy-chief.html. 
 62. For an analysis of Greece’s recent cutbacks in military spending, see Daniel Marans, Lovable 
Austerity: Greeks Say Cutting Military Spending Further ‘Is A Pleasure For Us’, HUFFINGTON POST, 
June 16, 2015, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/16/greek-austerity-military-
spending_n_7597896.html. 
 63. Stephen Sestanovich, Obama’s Focus is on Nation-Building at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/11/weakness-or-realism-in-foreign-
policy/obamas-focus-is-on-nation-building-at-home. “Nation-building here at home” has been a 
frequently-repeated rhetorical phrase of President Obama, both during his election campaigns and 
during his term in office. The phrase contrasts Obama’s restrained foreign policy with the activist neo-
conservative foreign policy of Obama’s predecessor President Bush.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:161 
 
 
 
 
to convince countries to contribute more resources toward increasing the 
U.N.’s military role on the world stage. Unfortunately, national interest 
calculations still appear inescapable: nations lose control once assigning 
military or financial resources to the U.N., which then can use these 
resources to, potentially, frustrate the contributing nations’ own national 
interests in conflict areas. To safeguard against this possibility, the nations 
that contribute the most resources to the U.N. would likely demand more 
control over the military activities of the U.N. The U.N. would then be 
open to the charge that it abandoned its original mission and became a 
rubber-stamp for the world’s most powerful nations. This would 
undermine the chief advantage of the U.N., which is the legitimacy 
derived from being an international organization composed of co-equal 
sovereigns. 
Without a marked increase in contributions from its member nations, 
however, the U.N. will be incapable of providing the necessary manpower 
and equipment for humanitarian interventions on its own. In terms of its 
military personnel, the U.N. is already “desperately overstretched;” while 
uniformed U.N. personnel numbers over 100,000 in total, they are spread 
so thin across the world that the U.N. cannot hope to shape the 
fundamental situation in any single conflict.
64
 In a multipolar world, the 
U.N. will likely continue to function as a peacekeeper in certain conflict 
areas. In order to expand the U.N.’s role in prosecuting humanitarian 
interventions to more areas, however, a greater commitment to the size 
and budget of the U.N.’s forces would need to be effected. But even 
leaving concerns of encroachment on sovereignty aside, procuring 
significantly increased funding or manpower for the U.N. seems unlikely 
in an age of austerity.  
 
 
 64. RICHARD H. COOPER & JULIETTE KOHLER EDS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL 
MORAL COMPACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 25 (2009). In 2009, the UN had approximately 80,000 
military personnel and 15,000 civilian personnel deployed worldwide. This compares with a 
worldwide total of 20 million men and women in uniform employed in armed services falling under 
the direct control of sovereign nations. The ratio of uniformed personnel under sovereign control 
versus those under U.N. control is thus approximately 200:1. It seems clear that fundamental change in 
the service of humanitarian intervention will require a greater buy-in from sovereign nations. See 
generally Gladstone, Rick, Top American Commander Warns U.N. That Too Few Carry Efforts For 
Peace, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/world/top-
american-commander-warns-un-that-too-few-carry-efforts-for-peace.html?_r=0. As of June 30, 2015, 
there were 105,394 U.N. personnel in uniform. See PEACEKEEPING FACTSHEET, http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (last accessed Aug. 16, 2015). 
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D. Regional Organizations 
A multipolar world might, however, yield a more robust role for 
regional organizations to conduct humanitarian interventions in their own 
regions.
65
 Many of these regional organizations have a history of 
cooperation in other areas of international law, especially on matters of 
trade and the economy.
66
 Some even work on human rights, which can 
serve as a reservoir of expertise in a transition toward humanitarian 
intervention.
67
 Yet the challenges of conducting human rights 
investigations still differ fundamentally from those of humanitarian 
interventions, which often involve active military operations. 
Nevertheless, if such organizations could assume the role of a 
humanitarian police force, they could provide a happy medium between 
the unilateral and international (U.N.) approaches to humanitarian 
intervention.  
There are certain advantages to pursing humanitarian intervention at 
the regional level. Regional organizations may possess superior cultural 
and historical knowledge of the region of concern, be less vulnerable to 
the charge of neo-imperialism, be less likely to be viewed with suspicion 
by local populations, and perhaps, also be less vulnerable to geopolitical 
pressures when compared to a worldwide body such as the U.N. 
 
 
 65. Such regional organizations include the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the 
Organization of American States (OAS), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Of these, the African Union has been most active in committing resources toward humanitarian 
intervention. Stephanie Hanson, The African Union, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Sept. 1, 2009, 
available at http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/african-union/p11616. This can be explained as a 
logical outcome of the frequency and severity of humanitarian crises in Africa. However, the African 
Union has also come under criticism for being slow to react to humanitarian crises. Julius Agbor and 
Tatah Mentan, After 50 Years of the OAU,-AU: Time to Strengthen the Conflict Intervention 
Framework, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, May 13, 2013, available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/22-africa-conflict-intervention-agbor. African leaders also express a 
principle of non-interference in the affairs of their fellow African nations. Id. There is also a growing 
perception that the workings of international humanitarian law (especially the International Criminal 
Court) unfairly single out the African continent. Adam Taylor, Why So Many African Leaders Hate the 
International Criminal Court, WASH. POST, June 15, 2015, available at https://www.washington 
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/15/why-so-many-african-leaders-hate-the-international-criminal -
court/. Of the Western powers, France has been most active in intervening in West and Central Africa, 
a former colonial region. Vincent Darraq, France in Central Africa: The Reluctant Interventionist, AL-
AL-JAZEERA, Feb. 11, 2014, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/france-
central-africa-reluctant--20142975859862140.html. 
 66.  The proliferation of regional trade organizations indicates a willingness to cooperate on 
matters of trade, the environment, and other issues which have always had a transnational component. 
However, regional integration on matters of security and foreign policy—quintessential sovereign 
prerogatives—may prove more difficult. 
 67. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), a division of the Organization 
of American States (OAS), is one such example. 
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If more authority over humanitarian intervention were delegated to 
regional organizations, then there would also be more congruity between 
the nations tasked with approving interventions and those expected to 
carry them out. At the U.N. level, there is somewhat of a misalignment 
between those nations who can approve humanitarian intervention and the 
nations who must bear its costs. Whether at the U.N. or regional level, a 
new framework for humanitarian intervention must be designed to share 
the significant fiscal and military costs of intervention as equitably as 
possible in order for the concept to work in a multipolar world. 
CONCLUSION—THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
In the early twenty-first century, the theory of humanitarian 
intervention has become increasingly sophisticated, as evidenced through 
the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. However, 
over the same period, the practice of humanitarian intervention has 
declined along with the relative power of the United States. The focus 
must now shift to shaping the rules governing humanitarian intervention in 
a multipolar world. Those most likely to further humanitarian goals would 
openly accept the pursuit of national interests and also task more authority 
to regional organizations to provide global citizens with security from 
impunity. 
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